
Interview: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger: Matters Arising
12 April 2024 22:52
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By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh
In this insightful interview, Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu at the Faculty of European Studies, Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania), where he serves as a Director of the Centre for International Cooperation and as Director of the Centre for African Studies, discusses the political situation in the French-speaking West African countries, the existing multiple challenges and Russia's diplomacy within the context of current geopolitical changes and the scramble for influence in Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:
To
begin with, what are your arguments that Russia supports military coup
makers (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger et cetera) in Africa?
The
logic behind backing the coups is quite evident and relates to the
strategy of Russia to fight against the West and to (re)entrench itself
in Africa. As the former presidents of the three countries have been
supported by the United States, by the European Union, and above all, by
France, the only strategic option of a Russian reemerging empire
opposing the West was to back all the anti-Western forces wherever they
might act and whoever they would be.
Since
the late 2000s, Russia has been increasingly preoccupied with preparing
the ground for anti-Western operations. the progressive entrenchment of
the Kremlin-guided paramilitary groups (starting with the infamously
Groupe Wagner) in the Central African Republic, then in Mali and to a
lesser extent in other parts of Central and Western Africa, has only
been the visible peak of the iceberg. More effective were the troll
farms populating the sub-continent with pro-Russian influencers and
deploying campaigns of disinformation, which targeted especially the
French and UN contingents deployed to fight the jihadist groups. These
campaigns contributed in turning the public opinions of those states
against the West and more importantly against their presidents, who were
denounced as being the "Occident's puppets”.
While
the operations of the coups themselves were most probably not directly
coordinated by Russia, the attitude of the national military forces and
of the mass of demonstrators who backed the coups was definitely shaped
by Russia. The fact that the new juntas in power immediately made
declarations and gestures (such as state visits) of rapprochement
towards Russia testifies once more of a mechanical convergence of
interests between the new strongmen in Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey,
to which Russia has abundantly contributed over the last decade.
As
it explicitly shows, Russia is seemingly interested in military
governance in Africa. Does that set the precedence for future military
take-overs in Africa?
The
outcome of the coups in the three Sahelian states encouraged Russia in
pursuing its strategy in other African countries. Nonetheless, the
dismantlement of the Wagner Group and the difficult reorganization of
its remaining elements made the Kremlin's task more difficult, as some
axes of penetration into the decision-making and military milieus of the
African countries have been strongly shaken, although the new high
responsible for the operations, Vladimir Alexeyev, makes substantive
efforts to regain control over the remaining networks.
Moreover,
the amplitude of the Dimitri Prigozhin's finally aborted rebellion
against the Kremlin raised some questions in the minds of many African
political, business and military supporters of Moscow. Among those
questions, the most important is the following: If the Russian regime
itself was on verge of facing a military attack against its capital, how
could it guarantee our support in the eventual case we will try to
conduct coups similar to those in the Sahelian countries? Consequently,
the other would-be putschists' enthusiasm in following the Sahelian
coups’ path has naturally diminished.
Do
transitions from democratic governance to military governments have any
meaning for fighting growing trends of neo-colonialism in Africa?
Neo-colonialism
in Africa has been a growing reality after the end of the Cold War and
reached a pinnacle by the early 2000s. Then, the combined effects of
September 11 and the anti-neocolonial activism of some leaders such as
Laurent Gbagbo in the Ivory Coast rebalanced the power relations making
the West increasingly dependent of the strategic support of the
"friendly” African heads of state.
More
salient in the case of the former French colonies, this process could
be suggestively described by the transformation of the "Françafrique”
into the "Afrique-France”, with Gabon’s historical leader Omar Bongo
gaining an unprecedented leverage, going so far as he was able to
influence the composition of the French governments of those times. But
once again, this page was turned with the world economic crisis
of 2008-2011 and with the considerable growth of the jihadist attacks,
leading to the destabilization of Mali and to the risk of generalization
over the entire Sahelian region.
The
French-led anti-jihadist operations Serval and then Barkhane, deployed
in Mali and reshaped later on into an international security task force
with a wider focus on Sahel, has implicitly deprived to some extent the
democratically elected presidents of Niger, Burkina and Mali of their
autonomy in matters related to national security and political strategy.
This was seen by many as the ultimate proof of the return to
colonialism. As the results of the fight against Islamist terrorism have
been increasingly modest, especially after 2019, the contestation of
the Western-backed presidents has become widespread at different levels
of the society, of the institutions and of the security forces. This
explains the popular support for the series of coups perpetrated in the
three countries and shows the important potential that
anti-neo-colonialism has as a galvanizer of the discontented peoples of
Africa.
Despite
the above narratives, do you think ECOWAS, the 15-member regional
economic bloc, must be firm with 'Silence-the-Guns' policy adopted
several years ago by the African Union?
The
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was caught in the
trap of its transformation from a quasi-economic organization to a
semipolitical one. If by the 2010, the policy of sanctions against the
illegitimate governments and the direct interventions it operated (like
the one in The Gambia against the former president Yahya Jammeh, who
refused to leave power after loosing the elections in 2017) encountered a
relative success, the more recent policies proved inefficacious,
culminating with the July 2023 postponed and ultimately cancelled
intervention against the putsch in Niger. The legitimacy of ECOWAS has
been strongly contested by the new military regimes. At the same, the
‘Silence-the-Guns’ AU-inspired policy has proved idealist, especially
when it comes the conflicts in Sahel that multiplied "under the watch”
of the two organizations.
A
research report from the South African Institute of International
Affairs (SAIIA) describes Russia as 'a virtual investor' in Africa, most
of its limitless pledges and several bilateral agreements largely aimed
at luring (woo-ing) African states and leaders to support its 'special
military operation' in neighbouring Ukraine. What are your expert views
and arguments here?
Vladimir
Putin has intended to restore the mightiness of the Soviet Union,
including its influence over the African continent. But unlike the USSR,
Russia didn't and doesn't dispose of the financial and logistic
resources needed to massively invest in the key-sectors. To compensate
its economic debility, the Kremlin inaugurates almost insignificant but
ostentatious investment projects and at the same aggressively promotes
the anti-Western discourse ("Russia helps, the West takes”).
Moreover,
it uses the dependence of several African countries of the Russian
cereals to "adjust” their positions with regard to the illegal Russian
war against Ukraine, especially when it comes to votes taken in the UN
General Assembly. A strategy of combination between the Russian
para-military presence and massive resource grabbing was applied in the
Central African Republic (CAR), where President Faustin-Archange
Touadéra saved his seat by relying on a Russian praetorian guard, while
in exchange he accepted to formally or informally grant extended rights
of exploitation of many gem mines to the companies led by
Kremlin-friendly oligarchs, who are the new de facto rulers of the
respective mining areas and implicitly of some wider regions in the CAR.
Seen as a "laboratory” for the further expansion of this toxic model,
the CAR is praised by the Russian military-business elites, who suffer
because of the international sanctions, as an Eldorado, proving once
again the particularly aggressive neocolonial strategy that Moscow is
implementing while criticizing the West.
In
practical terms and compared to China, do you think Russia has made
visible impact on the economy and infrastructure development in the
continent since the collapse of the Soviet era in 1991?
China
has disposed of important financial resources and has been at least
between the 1990s and the end of the 2010s incomparably less violent
than Russia in spreading its influence all over the African continent.
Being led by a regime who spoused the "state capitalist” system, China
was capable to use most opportunities provided by the intensive
globalization process to extend its presence and to consolidate its soft
economic power. And it succeeded in impressing via its investments in
the road and railway infrastructures, in ports, in some major public
buildings and in other sectors. As compared to China, Russia made almost
no difference through its modest investments and bet its entire
strategy on this mixture of, on one hand, the renewal of the former USSR
networks and the reification of the Soviet past, and on the other, the
direct intrusion in the domestic conflicts of the most vulnerable
African states.
Can
we conclude this discussion with the significance of peace, justice and
strong state institutions (UN SDG 16), what has been achieved over the
past few years, the challenges and the way forward in West Africa?
Unfortunately,
the SDG 16 is an untouchable horizon for most African states at this
stage. The return of the jihadist threat in several regions of the
Sahel, Western Sahara, but also Central and Western Africa, with the
extension of the operations of various groups affiliated to Al-Qaeda,
ISIS or Boko Haram has engendered an important security crisis that
crucially affected the stability of the African states.
The
series of coup d’états and unconstitutional replacements of the former
or acting leaders (in Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Niger) was a
response to the inaptitude of the democratic institutional settings to
guarantee the basic rights of the citizens, starting with the rights to
live and security. The new geopolitical thick division caused by the
2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine contributed to the aggravation of the
security context, especially in terms of food and human security, and
deprived many African governments of their capacity to negotiate with
multiple actors at different levels, as they are now constrained to pick
sides and to act accordingly, like during the Cold War era. If the
actual trends continue, I am not optimist at all about the possibility
of getting closer to meeting this SDG.
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Interview: Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger: Matters Arising
By Kestér Kenn Klomegâh In this insightful interview, Professor Sergiu Mișcoiu at the Faculty of European Studies, Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca (Romania), where he serves as a Director of the Centre for International Coope